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PREFACE 
This Professional Guide is one of a series of technical publications 
prepared under the direction of the Protective Structures Division, Office 
of Civil Defense. The purpose of the Office of Civil Defense Technical 
and Publication Program is to assist architects and engineers in the plan-
ning and design of structures that contain protective features. 
This publication was prepared for the Department of Defense, Offic~ 
of Civil Defense, by the Small Homes Council - Building Research Council 
of the University of lllinois, Rudard A. Jones, Director; Brian J. Crumlish, 
Principal Investigator and Author. Members of the staff of the Small Homes 
Council - Building Research Council, along with certain members of the 
University of lllinois Departments of Architecture and Civil Engineering, 
assisted in the investigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Because the principal targets of a nuclear attack could be 
metropolitan areas or areas surrounded by mass housing, the vulnera-
bility of the residential structure to the effects of nuclear weapons should 
be reduced. This could result in a reduction in the number of houses 
destroyed and ease the burden of rehousing the population following an 
attack. · 
The architect or the engineer and his client will have to decide 
the extent of protective measures to be taken. This decision will be in-
fluenced by the location of the residence with respect to probable targets 
and the additional investment that the owner wishes to make. 
Although total blast, thermal, and radiation protection is 
economically impractical, it should be kept in mind that with each pro-
tective measure taken, the probability of destruction is effectively 
decreased. 
Added strength will have other compensations in the form of 
greater resistance to such natural hazards as hurricanes, tornadoes, and 
earthquakes. Simple methods and devices used to provide protection 
from thermal radiation will lessen the vulnerability of the house to other 
fire dangers. Fallout shelters can be incorporated within the residence 
or reliance can be placed on available community shelters. 
Better utilization of inherent resistance results from good 
planning of the structure and the site. Additional expense required in 
most cases is nominal. 
vi 
CHAPTER I 
NUCLEAR EFFECTS AND RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION 
1-1 General 
In the design of a residence to conventional standards, building 
codes and good practice have established minimum design standards 
which a structure must meet to be considered safe. When designing to 
resist the effects of a nuclear explosion, relatively limited test data is 
available. An exact design basis for these new forces is difficult to 
establish. In the area of residential construction, it is recommended 
that the designer examine the residence as a whole and modify its most 
vulnerable details rather than attempt to establish exact values on which 
to base the resistance of the house. Obvious fire hazards should be 
eliminated, weak structural parts strengthened, and inherent radiation 
barriers better utilized to provide a higher degree of resistance and 
protection. 
Ideally, a balance of resistance to all hazards should be attained, 
but for this one must assume a specific bomb size, an exact position of 
the house relative to the detonation, and certain climatic conditions. Any 
variation could subject the house to an increase in certain nuclear effects 
and a decrease in others, as the intensity of each effect varies inde-
pendently. The complexity of combining these variables results in an 
almost infinite pattern of design criteria. 
Examination of some of the elements influencing the nuclear 
effects points out the wide variations that may be expected. First, the 
most obvious variation results from the size of the weapon exploded. 
Both blast pressures and gamma radiation hazards increase with the 
magnitude of the yield, as does the total heat emitted; but the duration of 
the thermal pulse increases with the yield, diminishing the hazardous 
effect of thermal radiation. 
Further variations result from a change in the height of burst 
above the ground. Fallout in large quantities will only result from the 
contact of the fireball with the surface of the earth, while thermal and 
blast effects at a given distance will increase with the burst height up to 
a certain altitude. Atmospheric conditions, varying continuously, present 
another incalcuable factor. For example, direction and speed of high 
altitude winds varies the distribution pattern of fallout; atmosphere with 
limited visibility attenuates or weakens a thermal wave. The relationship 
of the house to an explosion, the distance, and intervening terrain further 
increase or decrease certain effects. 
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Approximately one-half of the energy released from a thermo-
nuclear explosion is in the form of blast or pressure energy, one-third 
is in the form of thermal energy, and the remainder in the form of 
prompt radiation and residual radiation or fallout. In general, it may be 
said that the fallout will cover the largest area and present the greatest 
direct hazard to the population. Blast and thermal effects will have 
limited ranges and present hazards both to buildings and to the popu-
lation. 
Figure 1-1 illustrates an idealized pattern of anticipated dangers 
from a one megaton surface burst, assuming a 15 mph wind. 
1-2 Thermal and Fire Hazard 
The thermal energy released from an explosion is in the form of 
visible light, infrared, and ultraviolet rays. This energy travels out-
ward in a straight line in all directions from the detonation at the speed 
of light and is the first effect to reach the area surrounding the target. 
The amount of this energy received, the time period over which 
the energy is applied, and the ignition point of the material receiving the 
energy will determine the probability of fires. The measurement of 
total heat is a direct function of the bomb yield, and the total energy re-
ceived on a given area diminshes inversely with the square of the dis-
tance between the area and the point of burst. The duration of the 
thermal pulse increases with the magnitude of the yield. Therefore, 
more total heat, measured in calories per square centimeter, will be 
required to ignite a material from a megaton explosion than would be 
required from a lower yield weapon. 
The ignition point of the material is dependent upon such physical 
characteristics as moisture content, temperature difference, thickness, 
and color. Paper, trash, grass, dry leaves, and window curtains have 
low ignition points. Wood exposed to thermal radiation usually exhibits 
only transient burning but will be charred to a depth closely proportional 
to the energy received. 
In the fringe areas, where it is expected that strengthened houses 
will withstand the subsequent blast wave, the thermal intensities re-
ceived as a direct result of the thermal pulse will not be sufficient to 
cause ignition of well-maintained structures. The chief fire danger 
results from the ignition of more flammable materials in the yards or the 
interiors of the houses, and from the spread of these fires to the 
structure. In addition, the danger of fires as an indirect effect of the 
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destruction of the blast wave should be considered. Upset stoves and 
furnaces, electrical short circuits, and broken gas lines may start fires 
within a structure that might otherwise be isolated from flammable 
material. 
Since direct exposure to a thermal pulse is not the chief fire 
danger to residences, the designer should base his planning and 
material selection on good fire prevention standards with general 
knowledge of the reaction of buildings to a thermal pulse, rather than on 
anticipated or calculated thermal intensities. If the structure is in-
tended as a shelter, special attention should be given to shield the occu-
pants from the heat wave, as the thermal intensities which might not 
cause severe damage to a structure could be extremely dangerous to the 
occupants. 
Generally, the design of a residence less vulnerable to thermal 
effects should follow some simple rules to limit combustion and the 
spread of fires. Materials that will not sustain combustion should be 
used on exposed surfaces of the exterior. Exposed flammable materials 
should be shielded by barriers that will attenuate or reflect the thermal 
wave. Where possible the structure should be isolated from other 
elements with low ignition points. Where isolation cannot be accom-
plished by distance, physical barriers should be incorporated in the 
design. 
1-3 Blast Effects 
The extremely high temperature within the fireball causes a rapid 
expansion of the surrounding air. As these gases expand, a pressure 
front travels outward from the detonation at a velocity higher than the 
speed of sound. As the volume of air enclosed in the pressure front in-
creases, the pressure decreases, and then, as the gases cool, the 
pressure drops below normal and the direction of the front reverses. 
The pressure fronts, both positive and negative, are followed by rapid 
movements of air rushing to equalize the pressures. 
The blast front, moving at such high speeds, will pass through the 
area surrounding an explosion shortly after the thermal pulse. The first 
effect as the front contacts a structure results from the almost instan-
taneous increase in air pressure, called overpressure. This over-
pressure, when acting on a surface perpendicular to its direction, is 
amplified to a greater magnitude, called the reflected overpressure. 
The amount of increase in the low overpressure ranges is shown in 
Figure 1-2a. In the peripheral areas it may be assumed that the blast 
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front travels as a vertical wall, and the variation in reflected over-
pressure values with respect to angle of incidence should be noted for 
variations in roof pitches. Surfaces parallel to the movement of the blast 
front do not build up reflected pressures, and are subject only to the peak 
incident or side-on overpressure. 
The difference in lateral loading resulting from reflected 
overpressures tends to move the entire structure because of the lack of 
an equalizing pressure on the opposite wall. Large buildings are more 
subject to this translational loading because of the time required to engulf 
the building. The time taken to engulf a residence, because of its rela-
tively small dimensions and the speed of the blast front, is so short that, 
rather than gross movement of the house as a whole, the loadings from 
overpressures and reflected overpressures on the component parts are 
the chief concern. 
After the blast front has engulfed the entire building, the pressure 
differences between the exterior and interior have a tremendous crushing 
effect on the structure. These pressure differences attempt to equalize 
through the various openings and cracks in the building, and, as the blast 
front moves onward, the pressure may build up within the structure to a 
level higher than the outside pressure. The structure would then be sub-
ject to an exploding force. See Figure 1-3. 
approach of blast front reflected overpressure totally engulfed house explosive phase 
figure 1-3 blast effects on a house 
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The subsequent dynamic or drag forces caused by the rushing of 
air behind the pressure front, unlike the overpressures, act only in the 
direction of their path. The effects of these winds on a structure are 
similar to those experienced in a tornado. In the overpressure range be-
tween 2 and 5 psi, the velocities range from 7 0 to 160 mph. These later-
al forces may induce uplift or compres~3ive forces on the roofs, transla-
tion or rotation of the structure, and bending or racking of the walls. 
Pressure variation with angle of incidence is shown in Figure 1-2b. 
The radius of the structurally damaging effects of the blast wave 
traveling through the air extends as far as 20 or more miles, depending 
on the yield of the. nuclear device. Some of the energy of the explosion 
appears in the form of a stress wave in the earth which travels outward 
from ground zero. The resulting earth motion does not create much 
damage to aboveground structures beyond a rang~ equal to twice the cra-
ter radius, which is under a halt-mile tor a one-megaton surface burst. 
The shock wave traveling in the air will, however, exert some downward 
pressure which will be transmitted by the soil to the structure. 
Sone general statements can be made in regard to strengthening a 
residence to resist blast effects which may serve as broad guides in pre-
liminary design. It should be mentioned, as in the case of thermal radi-
ation, that these principles apply chiefly to the structure and do not 
necessarily imply blast protection for the inhabitants. At best, structur-
al resistance .in residential construction can be developed to resist 5 psi 
over pressure at moderate expense. Overpressures below this are not 
generally fatal, but, at these pressure levels, secondary effects of blast 
are still quite hazardous. At less than 1 psi, the shattering of glass and 
flying debris presents a problem that should be cosidered for a more 
protective structure. 
At testing grounds in Nevada, strengthened houses were exposed 
to atomic blast pressures. Observation of these houses during the blast 
phase showed that at very minor overpressures window glass shatters; 
at less than ! psi there is damage to door and window frames and mod-
erate plaster damage; at 2 psi damage is moderate to a frame house; 
and at 3 psi it is severe. 
To improve resistance to the effects of blast it is recommended 
that the weakest structural elements of a residence be strengthened first. 
other weak points may be strengthened as the budget permits. With 
each improvement, the residence becomes more resistant to damage 
resulting from other types of dynamic loadings. 
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The structural characteristics influencing the resistance to blast 
forces include strength and ductility, mass, and the presence of redun-
dant structural elements. Some degree of each is present in current 
house construction, ann it is hoped to use this inherent resistance more 
efficiently to decrease structural failure. 
Basically, strength is the ability of a structural element to resist 
deformation. In residential construction, blast resistance can be in-
creased by selecting ductile materials for structural parts and by making 
joints and connections more rigid to reduce deflections. Brittle mater-
ials, such as unreinforced masonry or certain panel materials, fail under 
small deformations, and unless failure is desired, as in the case of pres-
sure relief through windows, ductile materials should be used. Plastic 
deformation is achieved in masonry and concrete by introducing steel 
reinforcement. 
Further resistance can be achieved through increased mass, 
which decreases the acceleration of the structure under dynamic loading. 
The presPncc of renunnant structural parts adds considerably to 
the resistance of a house to blast loadings. Bringing into action theo-
retically non-structural materials or walls when other members deform 
undoubtedly accounts lor considerable irwrease in strength beyond <..:alcu-
lated failure. Interior partitions, floors, ceilings, and finish materials 
contribute resistance to loadings ordinarily not imposed on them. 
1-4 Nuclear Radiation 
The area covered by radioactive fallout represents the largest 
area covered by an effect of a nuclear detonation. Hazardous levels of 
fallout can be expected in the downwind direction at distances up to 
several hundred miles - considerably beyond the range of thermal and 
blast effects. Up wind, or in the case of an air burst, the hazards of 
residual radiation may be less critical than those of thermal radiation 
and blast. 
The comments on radiation protection here are limited to residual 
gamma radiation since prompt-gamma radiation from the explosion is 
present only in those areas where all nuclear effects are severe and pro-
tection is beyond the economic limit of typical single family housing. 
Neutrons and alpha and beta particles are not dealt with, as their at-
tenuation is not necessarily demanding on the architectural solution 
other than that of excluding the fallout from the protected area. 
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To be effective, fallout protection requires skillful planning and 
cannot usually be accomplished in a building the size of a residence with-
out the introduction of additional massive walls and overhead barriers. 
Complete fallout protection, or the construction of a house in which all 
areas are protective, would involve either exorbitant expenditures or a 
radical change in living habits. 
None of the types of radiation emitted has notable effect on the 
physical characteristics of buildings material. Radioactivity does not 
alter the structural properties or the appearance of the material exposed, 
and the materials that attenuate gamma rays do not become radioactive. 
All types of nuclear radiation resulting from a nuclear detonation 
are harmful to human beings, though they cannot be sensed except in very 
high intensities . 
The best method of providing protection from nuclear radiation 
is through the use of protective structures. Incorporating protective 
areas within the house, by nature of the construction involved, will also 
provide a well protected area against the natural phenomena. 
Protection may be accomplished by placing a shield between the 
source and those to be sheltered, or by reducing the intensity of the con-
tributing source. Shielding may be accomplished either by use of geome-
try or a barrier. 
Estimates of the attenuation of residual radiation in typical 
residential structures have been made, based partly on calculations and 
partly on measurements with simulated fallout. Some of the results 
obtained for various locations are given in Table 1-1 for one- and two-
story, brick veneer and wood frame houses. The "protection factor" is 
the ratio of the dose which would be received outdoors, without any pro-
tection, to that received at the indicated location in the structure. The 
values given are fairly representative but should not be regarded as exact. 
Deviations are to be expected because of differences in construction de-
tail and environment. 
Geometry shielding offers protection due to distance from the 
source of the gamma rays. The gamma ray exposure dose decreases 
with distance from the source. The relationship is dependent upon two 
factors similar to those which apply to thermal radiation. First, there 
is a general decrease due to the spread of radiation over larger areas 
as it travels. The dose is inversely proportional to the square of the 
distance from the source. Attenuation is also gained due to absorption 
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Type of structure 
One-story brick One-story frame Two-story brick Two-story frame 
veneer veneer 
Location 
Center Center Center Center Center Center Center Center 
First Floor of grd. of bsmt. of grd. of bsmt. of grd. of bsmt. of grd. of bsmt. 
area (sq ft) fl. fl. fl. fl. 
1,000 3.4 22 2.3 20 4.4 54 2.3 44 
1,200 3.1 18 2.2 17 4.4 41 2.4 37 
1,500 3.1 16 2.3 15 4.4 37 2.4 34 
2,:000 3.0 14 2.2 13 4.1 34 2.4 29 
Table 1-1 Protection Factors at Various Locations in Typical Residential Structures 
and scattering of the gamma ray by the intervening atmosphere. To take 
advantage of geometry shielding in planning, the designer should select 
a shelter location with maximum distance from sources of contamination. 
As the ground surface surrounding a structure contributes the majority 
of the radiation, the central areas of the residence are superior locations. 
The roof holding fallout contributes heavily to the radiation dose, and to 
gain maximum distance from this source, the lowest story of the resi-
dence should be considered for the shelter location. 
Barrier shielding applies the principle that gamma rays are ab-
sorbed or attenuated to some extent in the course of their passage through 
any material. As a rough rule, it may be said that the decrease in the 
radiation intensity is dependent upon the mass of the material between the 
source of the rays and the point of observation. It requires a greater 
thickness of a substance of low density, such as wood, than one of a high 
density, such as concrete, to attenuate the radiation by a specified 
amount. If sufficient thickness of material is interposed between the ra-
diation source and an individual, the exposure dose can be reduced to a 
safe level. The chief materials likely to be available for shielding against 
nuclear radiation are steel, concrete, masonry, earth, and wood. One 
inch of steel is equivalent in mass thickness to 4 inches of concrete, to 5 
inches of earth, or 16 inches of wood. 
To take advantage of barrier shielding, the designer should select 
materials which are economically feasible and are commonly used in 
residential construction to provide maxim urn barrier or mass shielding 
of a protected area. For instance, he should use the massive materials 
required for load bearing walls to form barrier walls for the protected 
area. Since mass materials are generally expensive, the designer 
should keep the shielded area to a minimum and consider utilizing shelter 
space for other family functions. 
Without altering protection factors, the amount of radiation re-
ceived may be substantially reduced by partial removal of the fallout 
material. Natural removal of the fallout material by wind or rain can be 
encouraged by utilizing details and planning devices which will make de-
contamination of the area easier, but they should not be expected to be 
completely effective. Finishes should be as smooth as possible on 
vertical as well as horizontal surfaces. Decontamination by hosing or 
sprinkling would require large quantities of water that may be in critical 
supply and eventually requires a system to remove the collected particles 
from the immediate area. Vacuuming will generally be a more effective 
means of decontamination. It is equally important to avoid designs that 
can trap fallout in critical areas. 
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CHAPTER IT 
PLANNING PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
2-1 Site Planning Considerations 
When an architect and his client are selecting a site, a study of 
natural protection features and landscaping could influence th~ir choice. 
Certain aspects of protection from terrain features take advantage 
of an assumed direction to ground zero. In many cases, especially in 
suburban areas, the most probable direction can be predicted: toward 
known defense installations, industrial areas, or the center of a large 
city. Even when a direction to ground zero cannot be assumed, many 
landscaping features can be used to reduce the vulnerability of a resi-
dence to nuclear effects. 
The terrain of the site and of the surrounding area has an influ-
ence on the magnitude of the thermal and blast energies received on a 
house. Grading conditions immediately around the house could have an 
influence on the amount of radiation received. Since any material which 
casts a shadow will offer a thermal shield, a house could be situated so 
that prominent land features shade the residence from the heat wave of a 
low angle or ground burst. Siting a house on the far side of a hill will 
also reduce the magnitude of the blast forces received since overpressure 
,-a lues increase when thf' pt·f'~su re front ascends an incline and decrease 
as the front descends. lh addition, protection is gained from being on 
the leeward side of the dyna1nic winds. 
Fallout quantities will not be considerably affected by the terrain 
surface features, since the period of greatest fallout will occur after 
the turbulence created by the explosion has subsided. However, grading 
near the house may be utilized as a barrier shield against fallout and can 
assist somewhat in the decontamination of the immediate area. Since 
bodies of water provide self-decontaminating surfaces, projects could 
take advantage of the smaller area contributing radiation when located 
near a lake or river. 
Some attention should be given to other landscaping elements. 
Trees on the site may provide a thermal shield but the house should be 
carefully situated with respect to them as the trees may be susceptible 
to sustained burning. In addition, the relatively small size of even the 
largest tree trunk enables it to withstand the overpressures, but the 
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following high winds will undoubtedly cause severe damage. Tornado 
damage observation shows that where the ground water level is not deep, 
tree roots pull free, causing considerable damage by breaking portions 
of street surfaces, curbs and sidewalks. Where ground water level is 
deep, or where the species have deep tap roots, trees break off five to 
ten feet above the ground. 
Landscaping should be laid out for convenient maintenance. 
Accumulation of leaves or debris against wooden structures represent a 
real fire hazard, since the ignition points of grass, dry leaves and pine 
needles are well below that of painted wood siding. 
The other architectural elements in the site development should 
be planned to take advantage of the benefits they may provide. Paved 
terraces and drives immediately adjacent to the structure provide an 
area more easily decontaminated, if their surface is smooth. Solid 
fences or screens can protect glass areas from thermal radiation. If 
massive, they will also provide shielding from residual radiation. Pools 
serve as reservoirs for fire-fighting water, and, since the fallout settles 
to the bottom, the self-decontaminated surface contributes less harmful 
radiation. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the neighboring structures 
should be considered. Masonry buildings close by can be regarded as 
a thermal shield or can provide a barrier shield from fallout. However, 
if they are flammable, nearby buildings could present a fire hazard. 
Skillful neighborhood planning could be an effective means of reducing 
area fires. From Figure 2-1 it can be seen that the distance between 
buildings should be at least 50 feet if the probability of fire spread is to 
be limited to 50%, and in order to eliminate the spread of fire almost 
completely the diiitance between buildings should be over 300 feet. 
In order to eliminate danger from falling utility poles and to 
insure continued service, underground utilities are preferable. Damage 
to underground. services beyond the ground shock area is not probable. 
Damage to water supply is critical for fire fighting. Loss of pressure 
through breakage of pipes in houses and other buildings is more serious 
than failure of underground pipes and could be partially remedied by use 
of flexible connections at the building. Valv:es should be provided to . 
prevent flow of contaminated water into the residence from the commun-
ity supply. Individual wells are recommended, as they insure water 
supply for fire protection and drinking. 
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figure 2-1 effect of building separation on fire spread 
If the probable direction of the blast can be assumed, it should be 
considered in the structural orientation of the house. General orientation 
of the house should be used to resist the blast forces, since the elevation 
facing ground zero is subjected to the highest pressures. The effect is 
not very pronounced in conventional structures which are generally of a 
rectangular plan, but a long, narrow structure will be more resistant to 
blast against the end than on the side. 
Figure 2-2 illustrates some of the points mentioned above as they 
could be applied to the site plan of a typical residence. 
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2-2 Structure 
2-2.1 General 
The choice of structural systems available in house construction 
is limited. Established methods have standardized procedures using the 
1nost durable local materials and systems that are suited to specific 
climatic conditions. Unless the budget of a house permits the use of a 
more resistant system, it seems reasonable to use the current methods, 
but to analyze and strengthen their points of weakness. Analysis of re-
sistance to blast forces involves revised loadings which are greater and 
proportional to the exposure angle. The ultimate or ultimate yield 
strength of materials and their connections should be used in the 
analysis. 
As the loading on the various exposed surfaces is relative to the 
angle of incidence of the blast front, all parts will not be subjected to the 
same loading. If the wall construction selected will ·withstand a given 
peak reflected overpressure, the floor construction (or a flat roof) need 
only withstand a proportional load equivalent to the peak side-on pressure. 
If a pitched roof is used, however, it would be required to carry as much 
as three times the side-on pressure. Figure 1-3a should be referred to 
in establishing balanced loading values for low overpressure ranges. 
Since the peak strength that can be developed by structural 
elements is considerably above the working stress, the allowable design 
stresses for blast loading should be increased. In some materials, the 
capacity to absorb energy up to the yield point is four times that normally 
accepted for design purposes, and complete failure is at still higher 
stresses. Therefore, it is recommended that ultimate stresses be used 
for wood, and in steel and reinforced concrete ultimate dynamic yield 
stresses and plastic deformation be utilized. Because of the dynamic 
character of the loading, design procedure should be based on dynamic 
analysis where plastic yielding of structural members may be permitted. 
In conventional house framing, the limiting forces that may be 
imposed upon the system will not always be governed by the ultilnate re-
sistance of the structural members but rather by the forces that can be 
~ransferred through the joints. Improved connection details must be 
used or the full efficiency of the structure will not be utilized. 
2-2.2 Concrete and Steel 
A small portion of the house building industry is currently using 
reinforced concrete and structural steel frames. Both systems are well 
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suited to blast-resistant design because of their ductility and the 
continuity achieved at the joints. 
Although its relatively high cost limits extensive use in 
residential construction, reinforced concrete, because of its mass, 
strength, and resilience, combines the advantage of high blast re-
sistance with excellent fallout protection and incombustibility. It is 
uniquely qualified as a system for more protective buildings. In those 
areas of the country where concrete cap beams and columns are used to 
resist hurricane forces, complete rigid frames can easily be evolved. 
Special consideration must be given to detailing to assure 
continuity and strength for the reversal of load. Shear reinforcement is 
more necessary and should be at right angles to the axis of the member 
in order to remain effective under reverse bending. 
The ultimate dynamic yield stresses recommended for reinforced 
concrete are shown in Table 2-1. 
In typical residential construction, structural steel is usually 
used where wood framing is not practical. With structural steel, proper 
anchorage and connections with floor or roof framing members are 
critical. Possessing high ductility and by joining through welding, steel 
has excellent application for blast-resistant systems. Using rigid frames 
fiXed at the foundation, structures of high plastic resistance can be 
designed. 
The recommended design stresses for steel are shown on 
Table 2-1. 
2-2. 3 Load-Bearing Wall Systems 
a. General: The most common building methods today in 
homebuilding are the load-bearing wall systems of masonry or wood con-
struction. As currently detailed, completed structures have less strength 
than can be developed in the basic elements of the masonry unit or the 
framing lumber. More efficient utilization of their strength can be 
achieved without radically changing construction techniques. 
b. Structural response of conventionally framed houses: 
Eventually, all loading imposed on the structure is transferred to the 
foundations. The path traveled depends on the framing method and 
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CONCRETE 
Compression 1.25f'c 
Shear • 25 f'c 
Bond • 25 f'c 
STEEL 
Tension or compression 42000 
Shear 25000 
Welds, rivets, bolts Use yield point values in 
tension or shear 
FRAMING LUMBER 
Douglas Fir* Western Hemlock 
Blast FHA Allowable Blast FHA Allowable 
Fiber c 5800 1200 - 1500 5100 1150 - 1450 
Stress K 2900 200- 850 2500 200- 750 
Tension c 5800 1100 - 1300 5100 1000 - 1250 
K 2900 0 2500 0 
Horiz. c 850 95- 120 850 80- 100 
Shear K 400 0 415 0 
Comp. 
Parallel c 4400 1000 4000 900 
to Grain K 2100 0 1900 0 
Comp. 
Perpen- c 650 390 510 365 
dicular K 320 0 250 0 
to Grain 
*Use same blast values for Southern Yellow Pine 
C = Clear Material K = Lumber with largest permissible knot 
PLYWOOD 
Tension and Fiber Bending 6600 
Compression parallel or perpendicular to grain 4850 
Shear 630 
Rolling Shear 240 
Table 2-1 Ultimate Design Stresses of Common Structural Materials 
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detailing. The elements interact indeterminately, and isolation of 
individual elements is the only practical method of structural analysis. 
Vertical loading from the reflected and side-on overpressures and 
uplift from dynamic forces imposed on the roof are transferred into the 
walls, and the walls in turn transfer the loads to the foundation. 
Horizontal loading may be imposed on both the roof and the wall 
sections of the house. The main forces tending to overturn or collapse 
the house are the reflected overpressure and the dynamic wind forces 
on the wall facing the direction of the blast. For a simplified analysis, 
the load on this wall may be assumed to be distributed equally to the 
foundation at the sill and to the roof and ceiling construction at the 
eaves. It is assumed that the horizontal force at the eaves is transferred 
through the roof and ceiling construction to the side walls, where it is 
finally transferred to the foundations. Interior partitions could be used 
to stabilize the roof through their connections at the ceiling. 
For the structural wall elements in a house with short periods of 
virbration and small plastic deformation at failure, the conditions for 
failure can be expressed as a peak overpressure without consideration for 
the duration of the blast wave. The failure conditions for elements of 
this type are given in Table 2-2. 
c. Masonry: Solid masonry, because of its mass, offers better 
radiation attenuation, and, even without reinforcement, it is able to with-
stand higher pressures than unstrengthened frame construction. A re-
sistance to 3 to 4 psi can be expected of a 12" brick masonry wall in 
ordinary construction. In order to achieve 7 to 8 psi resistance, it is 
necessary to restrain the boundaries of the panels between columns or 
beams or provide flexural resistance with reinforcing steel. 
Observation of a two story masonry residence of conventional 
construction (4" brick- 4" block) exposed to 5.1 psi showed that, although 
the walls were probably weakened by the external blast forces, the 
interior partitions and floor framing provided considerable lateral re-
sistance. Collapse of the structure was caused by the pressure build-up 
within the dwelling. Conventional framing techniques provide no re-
sistance in this direction. 
d. Frame Construction: Because it is an established system in 
residential construction, the continued use of conventional wood framing 
may be expected in most home construction. Considering the qualities 
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STRUCTURAL ELEMENT FAILURE APPROXIMATE 
SIDE-ON BLAST 
OVERPRESSURE 
Glass windows, large and small Shattering usually, occasional psi 
frame failure 0.5-1.0 
Corrugated asbestos siding Shattering 1.0-2.0 
Corrugated steel or aluminum Connection failure followed 1.0-2.0 
paneling by buckling 
Brick wall panel, 8 in. or 12 in. Shearing and flexure failures 7.0-8.0 
(not reinforced). 
Wood siding panels, standard Usually failure occurs at the 1.0-2.0 
house construction. main connections allowing a 
whole panel to be blown in. 
Concrete or cinder-block wall Shattering of the wall 2.0-3.0 
panels, 8 in. or 12 in. thick 
(not reinforced). 
Table 2-2 Conditions of Failure of Peak Overpressure-Sensitive Elements 
required to resist nuclear effects, wood has low mass-thickness and is a 
poor barrier to radiation. It has considerable structural resilience and 
will withstand minor blast pressures. The fire hazards associated with 
wood can be minimized. 
Since the chief fire danger results from the indirect effects of the 
blast and thermal pulse, fire danger exists even though a structure is 
properly maintained. In order to minimize the possibility of fire, wood 
that is pressure-treated with a fire-retardant, can be used for all 
framing materials, as well as for interior trim, paneling, and plywood 
sheathings. The additional expense can be partially justified by the 
termite and decay protection gained in the process, as well as the 
possibility of reduced insurance costs. 
Wood has the remarkable property of being able to carry high 
loads for short periods of time. However, information regarding its 
behavior under dynamic loading and experience in its use in blast-
resistant construction is limited. In designing frame houses for blast-
resistance, it is recommended that the loads be treated as static loads 
but the ultimate strength of the wood should be used for preportioning the 
members. · 
Table 2-1 gives recommended design stresses for framing 
materials under blast conditions, based on the assumptions that 1) blast 
loadings are of a relatively short duration; 2) strength of framing 
members will increase as the wood seasons; 3) safety factors have been 
omitted. 
e. Selection of material: Cost analyses point out that for the , 
strength gained compared with the expenditure, it is more economical to 
use a higher stress grade of lumber rather than increasing member sizes 
or decreasing member spacing. A stress grade of 1450f to 1500f is sug-
gested as the minimum to be used for framing lumber. If stress-graded 
lumber is not available in smaller sizes, the best material should be 
selected for the exterior or load-bearing walls. This material should be 
as free of strength-reducing characteristics as possible. Small knots 
should be away from the edges and the grain should be as nearly parallel 
to the edges as possible. Although wood will illcre&H in atrellith u it 
dries, the shrinkage around nail holes will decrease the effective strength 
of connections. Material with a high moisture content should be avoided. 
f. Connections: In wood framing, connections are critical points, 
and it is difficult to design an efficient connection. In conventional 
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framing , member sizes have already been increased to accommodate the 
required connectors. 
The most common connector for wood is the wire nail. This 
connector loses much of its initial holding power when green lumber is 
used and dries during service conditions. Tests based on a two-thirds 
penetration (rarely achieved in the field) show that a 2!-inch common 
nail has a withdrawal resistance of 264 pounds and a lateral load carrying 
capacity of 500 pounds. After the wood has dried, these values drop to 
77 pounds and 415 pounds. Clinching the nail increases withdrawal and 
lateral load-carrying capacity by 50%. Toenailing reduces the withdrawal 
resistance value of the nail by one third and lateral loading by one sixth. 
Since the quality of toenailing is so difficult to control, it is best to avoid 
the use of this method of fastening wherever possible. 
Special nails with deformed shanks have higher initial holding 
power and there is less loss as the lumber dries. A 2!" helically 
threaded nail loses withdrawal resistance from 331 pounds to 223 pounds 
and lateral load-carrying capacity from 751 pounds to 731 pounds. A 
2!" annularly grooved nail loses withdrawal resistance from 644 pounds to 
524 pounds and lateral load-carrying capacity from 620 pounds to 580 
pounds. Special nails are available for any use and can provide more 
efficient structural connections as well as fasten paneling, sheathing and 
trim more securely. 
The most difficult connection is the tension joint. For this 
connection, metal framing anchors should be considered, as they elimi-
nate much of the uncertainty of workmanship of toenailing and end-nailing 
and they load the nail in the most efficient manner. The anchor is 
formed from 20-gage metal and is fastened by special nails through pre-
punched holes. 
Other standard types of connectors, such as joist hangers, could 
be easily adapted to other applications than those for which they are pri-
marily intended. Again, their ultimate value should be utilized. This 
value is usually about four times the recommended deaign :values for 
short-term loading. Straps or plates can be made inexpensively and 
simple devices can be designed for particular situations. 
g. Fixity and continuity: Studies of rigid frames show that using 
pinned connections at column bases and rigid connections between columns 
and beams is a convenient method of achieving an efficient system. One 
of the best methods of achieving fixed joints is through plywood gussets or 
splice plates, attached with glue. Continuity can be achieved by using 
continuous members to avoid splicing, such as in floor joists, and by 
2-11 
balloon framing the gable ends and two-story elements. Where continuity 
is not practical, such as framing around masonry chimneys or stair wells, 
special attention should be given to the concentration of stresses at these 
JX>ints. 
h. Stressed skin construction: Plywood has high ultimate strength 
and, when glued to high stress-grade framing lUJr1ber to form a stressed-
skin panel, the strength of the section is increased considerably at very 
small additional cost. Plywood subfloors and wall and roof sheathing can 
be combined with framing members to form com}X>site sections. 
Field gluing is difficult to control, and certain precautions must 
be taken. Casein glues are easiest to use and may be used at any tem-
perature above freezing. Waterproof glues are more costly and require 
high temperatures for curing. For adequate bond, moisture content of 
the members to be glued should be below 16%. 
Flexural tests of plywood show a fiber stress of 6, 900 to 8, 500 psi 
at the pro}X>rtional limit, which compares favorably to the values obtained 
for solid Douglas fir. Certain characteristics, such as knots, knotholes, 
and pitch }X>ckets, reduce the cross-sectional area. Accordingly, the 
basic stress for the clear material must be reduced for each of the sever-
al grades of plywood. For C-D sheathing grade, it is conservative to 
allow a 25% reduction from the clear-grade unit stresses. Lower reduc-
tions are permissible for the better grades. If the factor of safety is 
removed, and it is assumed the moisture content remains under 16% 
and that the duration of the loading is under five seconds, the stress 
values shown on Table 2-1 may be used. 
2-3 Foundations and Basements 
2-3. 1 Planning Considerations 
If the residence is in an area where basement construction is 
feasible, the natural advantage of below grade construction should be 
utilized to provide less expensive and efficient shelter space. Maximum 
fallout protection will be provided if the entire shelter area is below 
finished grade. If part of the basement is above grade, there is a great-
er contribution of radiation through walls and windows. Solid masonry 
cross walls should be used to help resist lateral loads as well as to define 
the shelter areas. 
Openings in the basement walls should be limited since glass 
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presents no effective barrier to the gamma radiation. Also, it 
will not attenuate thermal radiation, and will shatter at very low 
overpressures. Where windows are necessary, wire glass, a 
protective inside screen of hardware cloth, or a baffle system 
should be used to limit the danger from flying glass. 
As the least vulnerable area, the basement could provide 
quite usable temporary living space. A possible design could 
anticipate the loss of the superstructure, and place special 
emphasis on planning a habitable basement area. Structural details 
would allow failure at the sill connection, · minimizing the stresses 
induced in the first floor framing system, which would serve as the 
shelter ceiling and roof. The floor system could be easily designed to 
withstand higher overpressures than the complete house structure and, 
in addition, take the load of the collapsed structure. A poured concrete 
floor system would be excellent for this purpose. Obvious design 
considerations would include the provision of an auxiliary exit, in-
clusion of toilet facilities, and the zoning of the heatfng system. 
2-3.2 Structural Consideration 
Loadings on the foundations or basement walls result chiefly 
from forces transferred to them from the superstructure. In tests 
conducted on a residence at the Nevada test site, where the air shock 
wave was estimated at 5 psi, the basement wall below grade suffered 
minor damage, indicating a relatively minor ground shock wave. 
Loads tranferred from the superstructure, which will vary with 
the size, shape and orientation of the house, should be calculated on the 
basis of the load which can be carried or transmitted by the weakest 
member or connection in the superstructure. As a result of loading by 
overpressure, reflected overpressure, and dynamic wind forces, both 
vertical and lateral loading will be imposed on the foundation. Vertical 
compressive forces transmitted from the roof, as well as the dead load 
of the house present no problem since they resolve into vertical axial 
loads tending to stabilize the foundation walls. Tension forces, result-
ing from wind uplift or the vertical component of the overturning force 
on the structure, require stronger connections at the sill than those 
currently used. 
The action of the house should be studied under loading received 
from each of its orientations. The forces due to the negative phase of the 
blast front need not be calculated if the positive pressures have been 
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studied from all directions. The forces acting on the foundations result 
from three possible movements of the house illustrated in Figure 2-3 . 
overturning, translation, and rotation. In studying the action of these 
forces, it should be assumed that the soil pressure and force of gravity 
provide the resistance to these forces. In the case of vertical compres-
sive forces transferred into the soil, soil bearing capacities may be 
doubled since the loadings a ·e of hort duration. Lateral forces tending 
to cause vertical uplift reactions are resisted by the dead load of the 
structure above, the available live load, and the we~ght of the footings 
and foundation walls. 
overturning translation 
figure 2- 3 movement of house on foundation 
The overturning tendency, which results from the reflected over-
pressure on the wall facing the blast, is in part resisted by the mass of 
the superstructure. It is critical in narrow two-story elements where 
the length of the moment arm of the overturning force approaches the 
length of the moment arm of the resisting dead load. The unbalanced 
moment, resisted by the mass of the footings under the blast face of 
the structure, requires transfer of tension forces through the sill. 
Special attention must be given to basementless houses in areas where 
1ootings near the ground surface provide negligible resistance. 
Translation, also resulting from unequal pressures, is the ten-
dency of the entire structure to slide on the foundation. Low structures 
are more subject to translation than two-story ones. Resistance is 
gained from the friction due to the weight on the foundation plus the 
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resistance in shear of the anchor bolts on the entire perimeter. Dis-
tribution of the load to the entire perimeter relies on a rigid floor struc-
ture. The resultant forces will be resisted by the passive earth resis-
tance on the leeward face and by shear in the end walls. Failure to tran-
sfer the force through the floor system will subject the foundation wall 
facing the blast to bending stresses. 
Rotational movement will be developed in residences with unsym-
metrical facades where the resultant action of the overpressure force does 
not coincide with the centroid of the resisting elements. The effects on 
the foundation and the sill are similar to the effects of translation. 
2-3. 3 Materials 
Conventionally built houses examined after tornadoes reveal that 
masonry foundations are inferior to poured concrete foundations. Block 
walls either collapsed or were sheared off along mortar lines, but no 
examples of failure in poured concrete foundations· were found. If block 
walls are used , sufficient shear resistance must be transferred to the 
side walls by the diaphragm action of the floor system. Block walls 
become more critical if they are exposed to the blast front, since the 
load is carried in bending in the vertical direction between the two floors. 
The tensile capacity of block is too low to consider using high-bond mor-
tars , and the wall should be designed with steel reinforcing rods. 
Cross walls in the basement of a two-story house tested in Nevada 
were effective in r esisting the movement of the first floor construction. 
However , it was concluded that where the first-floor framing is rigid and 
is properly anchored to basement walls r such shear walls may be 
unnecessary. 
2-3.4 Construction Details 
Since the transfer of all the forces must be made through the 
critical sill detail, the numerous possible methods of failure at this 
point should be studied. The anchor bolt must be long enough to develop 
sufficient bond to resist uplift forces. The cross section of the anchor 
bolt must be large enough to resist the tensile and shearing forces. The 
washer at the top of the anchor bolt must be large enough to prevent crush-
ing of the wood sill. The wood must be thick enough or the bolt large 
enough to provide bearing to resist the lateral forces. 
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The corrective measures taken should be in proportion to those 
taken for the entire residence. One-half-inch bolts spaced eight feet on 
center , as required in conventional construction will be adequate only 
under the lightest loading. To obtain strength compatible with the most 
resistive construction proposed in this guide, anchor bolts 3/4" in diame-
ter spaced four feet on center must be used. The sill condition shown in 
Figure 2-4a illustrates a conventional platform sill detail. All lateral 
forces received by the wall must be transferred into the sill by the toe-
nailing in the header. The condition can be greatly improved by extending 
the plywood wall sheathing beyond the sill as shown in Figure 2-4b. The 
modified ballon frame shown in Figure 2-4c eliminates transferring 
lorces through a toenailed connection. A metal anchor is recommended 
to transfer outward forces resulting from overpressures or reflected 
overpressures which build up within the structure. 
2-4 Walls and Partitions 
2-4. 1 Design Considerations 
All vertical surfaces facing a nuclear detonation will be subjected 
to reflected overpressures and thermal radiation. Therefore it is desir-
able that the house be oriented in such a manner that there will be a 
minimum surface facing the detonation. This presumes that a probable 
target area can be predicted. Interior partitions, exposed to lesser 
forces, should be arranged to contribute reinforcement to the walls sub-
jected to high loading, but partitions should be arranged so they will not 
form high pressure traps. 
In addition to providing pressure relief, openings in exterior walls 
reduce the exposed area, thus reducing the total loading applied on the 
surface. However, openings in the walls parallel to the blast direction 
reduce the effective shear strength of the wall and should be minimized 
and located as far as possible from the wall intersections without inter-
fering with the plan. 
Glass shatters at low overpressures, and the danger from flying 
glass extends to areas where little other damage can be expected. The 
minimum blast protection that should be incorporated within a residence 
would be to _provide at least one glass free area. 
Frames around openings are loosened and damaged at very low 
overpressures. For a very small cost {ncrease deformed shank nails 
can be substituted for plain shank nails on all window and door frame 
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scale: 3/4''•1'-o" 
installations of a residence, thus providing increased withdrawal resist-
ance after the framing members season. To resist the blast load, span-
drel panels below or above openings should be designed to span horizon-
tally rather than vertically. The panel could be detailed to blow in, 
reducing stresses in the adjacent panels and providing additional pressure 
relief. 
Glass areas, of course, offer no barrier to thermal radiation, 
and since the interior furnishings will ignite at low thermal intensities, 
special attention should be given to providing a thermal shield for these 
openings. Light colored metal venetian blinds will reflect the thermal 
pulse, and if vertical blinds exposing no ignitable tapes to the heat are 
used, they will remain in place to provide a partial barrier to the glass 
shattered by the subsequent blast wave. Also, the surfaces of walls 
opposite glass areas should be finished with materials with higher ignition 
points. If the architect participates in the selection of the furnishings, 
special consideration should be given to materials with a high ignition 
point and to the use of light colors for draperies, rugs, and upholstery. 
2-4. 2 Material Selection 
Material selection for walls and wall surfaces should be based on 
radiation attenuation or blast and fire resistant qualities, depending on 
the protective function of the wall. Walls of high mass thickness, such 
as stone, brick, or concrete, should be used where they will provide 
shielding for the shelter area. Surfaces should be as smooth as possible 
to avoid collection of fallout particles and to facilitate decontamination. 
Pourous material should be sealed. Resilient materials better withstand 
blast pressures. Brittle materials such as cement asbestos should be 
avoided. All good radiation barriers are relatively incombustible. The 
fire resistant qualities of cladding materials for frame walls, such as 
wood and shingles, can be improved by painting with light colors or by 
using fire-retardant paints. Rough sawn and natural weathered sidings · 
are not recommended. 
2-4. 3 Masonry Walls 
Masonry walls can be strengthened by providing tensile reinforce-
ment if the top and bottom are restrained by the ceiling and floor construc-
tion. The wall may be assumed to be a simple vertical span since 
continuity is difficult to achieve. With additional reinforcement at the 
base, some moment can be transferred into the foundation. 
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Arching of reinforced masonry walls can be achieved by tying 
the boundaries of the panels with tension members in the furring space. 
It is difficult to transfer sufficient forces into the foundation through 
wood furring. Figure 2-5 illustrates two methods of achieving arching 
resistance. 
The bonding strength between the masonry units is increased 
four times with the use of high-bond mortars. * When concrete masonry 
units are used. the tensile strength of the block. which is below that of 
high-bond mortar, will limit the strength of the wall. In cavity wall 
systems, where the two walls act independently, high-bond mortars will 
double the lateral loading capacity of the wall at a cost increase of about 
15%. 
2-4.4 Frame Walls 
Higher lateral strength in a frame wall is most economically 
achieved by 1) using framing material of a higher stress-grade, 2) using 
plywood sheathing, and 3) gluing the plywood sheathing to the framing. 
A 25% strength increase for either inward or outward loadings can be 
obtained by gluing, when using 2 x 4 1500f studs at 24" OC with 3/8" 
plywood sheathing. 
The tables in section 7 of this chapter list various wall sections 
with strength and cost increases based on a 26 1 x 52 1 house. The mode 
of failure of these wall sections varies; either in compression on reverse 
bending or in rolling shear of the plywood. Because of the expense of 
the plywood, it is generally more economical to decrease stud spacing 
and increase stud depth before applying plywood to the interior of the wall. 
*Structural Clay Products Research Foundation reports : 
"Severe lateral dynamic loading, using a safety factor of 1. 333 for 
momentary resistance in a disaster, will yield the following uniform 
static loads that can be sustained for the wall thickness shown and a 
span of 10 feet." (Using a high-bond mortar with clay masonry units). 
d - 4 inches w = 64 psf 
6 144 
~ 256 
10 400 
12 720 
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Plywood, in addition to providing greater bending resistance, 
increases the racking resistance of the wall. By using full height 
sheets, the plywood can be used to transfer the horizontal loading from 
the wall into the sill at the foundation or from the wall into the roof 
construction at the eave. In most cases the plywood is sufficiently strong 
to transfer the load that can be imposed upon the wall. Figures 2-4, 2-7 
and 2-10 illustrate methods of achieving this transfer at sill and eave 
conditions. 
The detail of framing upper floor levels into the exterior walls 
is a critical JX>int. The present practice of using platform framing 
illustrated in Figure 2-6a breaks the continuity of the wall studs, and the 
use of eight-foot sheets of plywood for sheathing provides no vertical tie 
at the joint. Ballon framing, as shown in Figures 2-6g and 2-6h, with 
glued and nailed plywood, will provide both a vertical tie and continuity 
at this joint. 
In masonry construction, the intermediate floor construction i:S 
important in resisting the lateral loads on the wall. However, unless 
joist anchors are installed, as shown in Figures 2-6e and 2-6f, the wall 
receives no benefit from the floor construction when subjected to the 
internal exploding forces. 
2-5 Roofs, Ceilings and Floors 
Horizontal planes serve as overhead barriers for fallout protec-
tion and are used structurally to transfer lateral loading to shear walls, 
in addition to carrying vertical loadings. 
2-5. 1 Design Considerations 
Because a major element in the architectural design of a resi-
dence is the form of the roof, the inherent resistance to nuclear effects 
of various shapes should be considered. A flat roof exposes the least 
surface to the thermal wave and it provides a rigid plane to transfer the 
reflected overpressures received on the front wall to the other walls. 
However, it is subject to more uplift from the dynamic forces. Because 
flat roofs do not drain rapidly and because the surfacing material is 
generally rough, decontamination is difficult. 
A sloped roof, though exposing more surface to a thermal front, 
is less subject to uplift forces, decontaminates more easily, and the 
additional height adds some geometry shielding. Though the strength of 
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a roof structure increases with slope, the proportion of loading from 
reflected overpressures increases more rapidly. At slopes between 
3/12 and 7/12 the roof construction may be assumed to be the weakest 
portion of a house. Of course, if the ridge and eave lines are parallel 
to the direction of the blast front, reflections will not build up and the 
roof will only be subject to equivalent side-on pressures. Overhangs 
and cornices, which are very useful in control of sun and rain, add no 
protection from nuclear effects, and it is recommended that these 
projections be minimized or specially treated since they increase the 
roof area affected by blast pressures. Figure 2-7 c illustrates a sug-
gested eave detail that will not transfer the overhang loading into the 
structure and that also provides an excellent tie between the roof and 
wall planes. 
2-5. 2 Structural Considerations 
All horizontal planes should be utilized to resist the lateral load;.. 
ing on the structure. Sloped roofs should be designed to carry the 
increased reflected overpressure. Attic spaces should be designed to 
resist the explosive effect. Flat roofs must be designed to carry a load 
equivalent to the side-on overpressure. Floors over basements, due to 
lack of pressure equalizing windows in the basement, must carry a load 
equivalent to the side-on pressure plus the possible load resulting from 
the collapse of the superstrueturP. Floors between levels above grade 
may be assumed to carry equal loading on both sides and are not critical. 
2-5.3 Sloped Roofs 
Tests of complete joist and rafter roof systems indicate failures 
occur at the heel and collar joints with loading greater than design load 
but considerably less than the strength of the ~raming members. Testing 
under blast conditions indicates that failure at the peak occurs from a 
pressure build up in the enclosed attic space. Simple and effective means 
can strengthen these joints. 
For example, five' 3!" common nails are required in the heel joint 
when rafters and joists are 16" OC with 4/12 slope as illustrated in Figure 
2-7a, according to the Minimum Property Standards for One and Two 
Living Units, published by the Federal Housing Administration. Test 
results have shown that this joint would require nine 3!" common nails 
to transfer the strength of only 2 x 4 rafters. As the rafters dry and 
increase in strength, the shrinkage around the nails will decrease their 
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holding power and reduce the subsequent strength of the joint. With 
contact area between the two members being limited, the addition of a 
sufficient number of nails to utilize the members fully is not possible. 
The amount of thrust transmitted through this connection under a given 
load is greater for the lower slopes and becomes critical at slopes less 
than 4/12. A 3/12 slope would require only six, double that recommended 
by MPS, in order to utilize the framing members fully. These nails are 
loaded laterally, and nearly twiee the force could be effectively trans-
mitted by substituting helically threaded nails for the common wire nails. 
The weakest joint in conventional construction to blast forces is 
the peak joint, where three 8d toenails tie the rafters to a non-structural 
ridge board. If compressive overpressure forces do not damage the joint, 
the subsequent pressure build-up in the attic space or the uplift force from 
strong winds loads these nails in withdrawal, and failure .is almost cer-
tain. The simplest solution would involve loading the nailing laterally 
by using a cleat below the ridge board or eliminating the ridge board and 
providing a plywood gusset. Figure 2-8a shows the peak joint and the 
recommended improvements. 
In conventional framing, the collar beam as a part may be con-
sidered as a brace between opposing rafters, effectively shortening their 
spans. At loads causing large deformation or near failure at the heel 
joint, the collar changes from a compression member to a tension mem-
ber resisting the spread of the rafters. Used at about one-third the 
distance down from the peak, a collar beam thus may induce severe bend-
ing in the rafters. In order to shorten the span of the rafters, it is 
recommended that diagonal members be extended from the rafter midspan 
down to a center bearing partition as shown in Figure 2-8b. 
Failure at the splice of ceiling joi$ts results from the thrust 
imposed in the joists by the rafters if the heel joint is improved as des-
cribed above. Splice overlaps should be increased in length, the nails · 
should be increased in length, and the number of nails should be greater 
than the number used in the heel joint. 
Beyond these simple modifications to the critical joints, the 
increasing of member sizes and specifying higher stress-grade materials 
in conventional framing would require even greater shear transfer 
through the joints. The most effective method of handling these joints 
in this event is to use glued and nailed plywood gussets and form trussed 
rafters. These various framing methods are illustrated in Figure 2-8b. 
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The lightest of the trussed rafter designs, fabricated with 
non-stress rated 2 x 4's in theW pattern, when spaced 24" OC, will 
contribute a strength compatible to that developed in a wall section with 
3/8" plywood sheathing glued to 2 x 4 studs. The saving in roof framing 
member sizes offsets the additional fabrication costs, the necessity of 
. center bearing partitions is eliminated, and the connections are con-
siderably stronger than conventional framing. In studying strength 
gained against cost, it is more economical to increase member sizes in 
trusses than to decrease truss spacing. 
Trussed rafters can be strengthened to be compatible with a 
stronger wall section. A modified Howe truss made with 1500f 2 x 6' s 
and spaced 16" OC is compatible with a wall section of 2 x 6's 16" OC 
with plywood sheathing nailed and glued. 
For resistance con1patible with stronger wall sections, the web 
pattern of the modified Howe perm its center bearing under the truss, 
which greatly increases its capacity. Beyond this point it is suggested 
that the ceiling construction be increased to withstand the side-on 
pressure and that minimum rafters be used in the .roof framing, antici-
pating their failure as shown in Figure 2-lOd. Conventional framing 
techniques would be used on the roof to sustain snow loads. If the pitch 
is steep enough, and if no web members or struts are used, the space 
could either be habitable or used for storage. 
With a light truss, some fixity can be achieved at the wall inter-
section by extending thf' wall stud inside the heel gusset as shown in 
Figure 2-7 e. Bearing the truss on the top chord may be avoided by taking 
the vertical loads through the glue-nail contact between the stud and 
gussets as well as through the ribbon added to aid in erection. Other 
systems of achieving rigid frames involve frame tilt-up rather than wall 
tilt-up procedures and are a more extreme departure from standard 
construction. Figure 2-9 illustrates some methods proposed for rigid 
frame construction. 
2-5.4 Flat Roofs 
As can be seen by the reflected overpressure curves, the 
compressive forces acting on a flat roof will be considerably less than 
those imposed on a sloped roof, and the flat roof becomes more economi-
cal when greater strength is desired. With a flat roof, utilizing bearing 
partitions, selection of framing members would be equal to those members 
selected for floor construction. The eave should be detailed to transfer 
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the wall loading to the roof. See FigUre 2-10. In masonry construction, 
a poured or precast concrete deck not only provides lateral support for 
the top of the wall but offers more mass for radiation protection. 
2-5. 5 Sheathing 
The actual failure of complete house construction occurs at loading 
beyond the calculated failure point, and it is assumed that some strength 
increase results from the sheathing forming a deep beam when fastened 
to the rafters. Plywood, glued and nailed to the roof construction, is 
recommended for this purpose. Used in such a manner, the roof struc-
ture becomes a rigid beam capable of transmitting lateral loads to the 
gable or end walls. 
2-5. 6 Floor Construction 
A study of the economies of gluing plywood subflooring to the floor 
joists indicates that substantial strength is gained for little additional 
cost. Gluing a floor system composed of 2 x 8's spaced 16" on center 
with!" CD plywood subflooring results in a 60% increase in strength. 
(Calculations are based on the surface grain parallel to the joist.) With 
the plywood on the top of the joist, the limiting load is usually governed 
by tension. To increase strength further, it is more economical to 
deepen the joist than to add plywood to the opposite side. In order to re-
sist lateral loading in the direction perpendicular to the direction of the 
joist span, solid bridging should be used opposite each wall stud in the 
first two joist spaces. 
2-5. 7 Ceiling and Attic Spaces 
It is difficult to fasten the ceiling to resist pressure build-up in 
the attic. In order not to throw additional loading on ceiling framing, 
the ceiling should be designed to pull loose and partially relieve 
pressures in the attic. For this purpose a soft, lightweight material is 
best. 
When a soft ceiling material is used, the ceiling structural 
elements must be designed to transfer the lateral loads to the side walls. 
The easiest way to do this is by nailing diagonal boards to the top of the 
ceiling members. In order to maintain pressure relief, spaced 1 x 6's 
should be used. Of course this type of construction would be used where 
the roof framing members are designed to remain in place. 
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In addition to a "blow-out ceiling", pressure within the attic space 
can be further relieved by increasing the louvre size in the gable ends to 
the maximum consistent with weather conditions. As an alternate, it is 
possible to install blow-out panels on the gable ends. 
2-5. 8 Material Selection 
Light colored shingles are preferable since they reflect more 
thermal energy. Wood shingles, darkened and dried by age, would be 
more hazardous than wood shingles treated with nonleachable fire-
retardant chemicals. 
Anchorage of roofing is not critical at low pressure levels. 
Following present recommended fastening standards is sufficient. As an 
added precaution, seal down or interlocking shingles may be used. 
Ease of decontamination varies with the roughness of the roofing 
surface as well as the slope of the roof. Metal roofings, such as terne 
or copper, will decontaminate more easily and are less vulnerable to 
ignition. Corrugated and inverted V-Type surfaces are difficult to de-
contaminate because a large part of the surface projects above the water 
flow. Roofs with extremely smooth surfaces are difficult to decontami-
nate because they resist the wetting action of water. For common roofing 
materials slopes of 3/12 or greater are needed to attain washdown 
effectiveness. 
Floors and ceilings will probably not experience any direct 
exposure to the thermal pulse and finish materials should be selected 
generally on their ability to retard the spread of a fire. Brick and 
slate flooring over a concrete slab could be considered to add some mass 
in radiation shielding. 
2-6 Fallout Shelter Considerations 
Planning flexibility is at a maximum at the beginning of the 
building program. If certain planning principles for fallout protection 
are considered in the overall scheme, the cost of incorporating shelter 
space can be kept to a minimum. Since shelter construction will increase 
the material requirements, and can increase the space requirements of 
the house, only minimun1 shelter planning standards need be· considered. 
Since a family shelter can have a capacity of up to ten persons, the space 
requirements could represent five to ten percent of the house area. 
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First, the designer must decide if the shelter area is to serve 
only as a shelter or is to be used for other purposes as well. As dual 
purpose space , the shelter could be part of the utility area, the pantry, 
or a TV alcove. Where basement construction is feasible, single use 
space will be more economical. 
Because of the rapid decay of the fallout material, it may not be 
necessary to spend the entire emergency period in a shelter area with 
a high protection factor, and the core concept should be considered. 
After a few days, short periods of time could be spent in areas with 
lower protection factors. Thus, if the shelter does not include all the 
necessities for a stay of two weeks, convenient access to these 
nf\cessities should be planned without requiring passage through com-
pletely unprotected areas. If minimum space requirements are used for· 
a highly protecteJ area, adjacent spaces to this core with lower pro-
tection factors can be used to expand the shelter as the radiation intensity 
decreases. Adjacent outdoor areas could be partially decontaminated, 
further enlarging the size of the protected area. 
Certain measures of habitability must be met to make a shelter 
usable. Shielding, floor space, and air are essential. Storage of water, 
food and supplies, sanitation, and power are also considerations that 
will influence the architectural design. 
Utilizing the principles of shielding discussed earlier and using 
certain other planning rules will result in more economical shelter 
space. The more nearly the plan of the house approaches a square, the 
greater will be the geometry shielding. A long, thin plan would either 
require the shelter space to be located on an exterior wall or result in 
inefficient corridor space on both sides of the shelter. Irregular plans 
with courtyards result in penetration of contaminated areas into the plan 
form. A study of the house in section will quickly identify the ideal 
location for a shelter area. Any portion of a house below grade should 
be given first consideration. Openings into the shelter area which pro-
vide access, light, or ventilation should be baffled. Baffle arrangements 
may be used either in plan or section as illustrated in Figure 2-11. 
The minimum space standards listed below, as established by 
OCD, are austere, but, used with the core concept, the minimum space 
could be used only for the highly protected area. 
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Area: 
Height: 
Volume: 
10 square feet per person with a minimum of 25 
square feet total. 
4 foot minimum 
40 cubic feet per person with a minimum of 100 
cubic feet. 
Minimum ventilation standards require 3 cubic feet per minute 
per person of outside air if a mechanical ventilation system is used. 
Mechanical air blowers are optional in residential shelters which are 
otherwise properly ventilated. Air openings in a shelter space should 
be no less than 20 square inches per person and no less than 80 square 
inches total. In completely enclosed and confined spaces, the occu-
pants of a shelter may generate enough heat to remain comfortable, 
depending on ambient temperature, but for shelter design of a more 
open character, an auxiliary heating source should be considered. The 
type of heating used would depend on· available fuel and oxygen supplies. 
Supplies must be stored within the shelter space or in an easily 
accessible area. If a pantry were part of the shelter area, there would 
be a constantly rotating inventory of food. The designer should not 
neglect the possibility of using the water heater or the water in a heating 
system as possible emergency water supplies. 
When not in use, the shelter space should remain dry and clean 
with a minimum of maintenance. 
Since utility operation might continue through the emergency· 
period or be resumed within the period of shelter occupancy, considera-
tion should be given to including toilet facilities within the sheltered area. 
The following plans have been included to illustrate some examples 
of incorporating a shelter area within a residence. 
The plan illustrated in Figure 2-12 shows a 26' by 52' single-story 
house with basement. The. shelter area in the basement is, in part, 
defined by two foundation walls and the masonry bearing wall supporting 
the fireplace co1_1struction. The enclosure is completed by the center 
bearing partition, which also serves as a shear wall for the super~ 
structure in the longitudinal direction. The baffle wall and the overhead 
slab are the only additional required construction. The concrete slab 
over the shelter also serves as a base for the tile flooring in the bath-
rooms. 
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The water heater is in the sheltered area, providing an emergency 
drinking water supply. 
The remainder of the basement has good protection, though not 
adequate to serve as a shelter in periods of heavy fallout unless a con-
crete slab is used for the entire first floor structure. After a few days, 
however, when the intensity of the radiation has diminished, short 
periods of time could be spent in the rest of the basement. The earth 
around the basement area should be banked up as high as possible to gain 
maxim urn shielding. 
The cross walls on both levels provide good resistance to lateral 
loading for the long walls of the house. The upper level plan is designed 
with a continuous center bearing and either a flat or sloped roof could be 
used. 
The two plans shown in Figure 2-13 could be either slab-on-grade 
or crawl space houses of about 1350 square feet. In both cases the 
utility room serves as the shelter area. The proportions of the plans 
require that one of the barrier walls be on the exterior. 
In plan "a", the exposed walls of the shelter, both on the exterior 
and inside the residence, could be of brick, stone, or solid concrete 
masonry, providing an attractive finish material for the wall as well as 
excellent shielding. 
The pantry is incorporated into the shelter areas of both plans, 
as is the water heater. 
In plan "b", the guest bath is within the shelter area, and, if 
water service resumes during the shelter occupancy period, could be 
used. In plan "a", access to toilet facilities requires passage through 
unprotected areas. This may be acceptable as the level of radiation 
diminishes. 
Both plans have numerous cross walls to add resistance to lateral 
loading on the long exterior walls. Plan "b" has a continuous bearing 
partition, which not only stabilizes the end walls but permits a choice of 
roof framing methods. In plan ''a", where the center bearing does not 
continue through the living room, trussed rafters could be used. 
The split-level scheme shown in Figure 2-14 illustrates how 
readily this plan type can be modified to include an excellent shelter area. 
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In the lower level, the shelter is enclosed by the addition of one barrier 
wall and an overhead slab. Earth around the shelter area is banked up 
for shielding. The planter which provides mass shielding on the remain-
ing exposed wall extends out as a retaining wall for the earth embank-
ment. 
This plan is also an example of the core concept. When the 
radiation level is low enough to permit short periods of exposure, the 
patio outside of the playroom could be decontaminated. This would 
enlarge the protected area to the entire basement where the natural 
daylight would be a pleasant change from the confined shelter. 
The plans illustrated in Figures 2-15, 2-16 and 2-17 show the 
possibility of designing above ground shelters that become an active area 
in the function of the plan. Through studied arrangement of the walls, 
radiation barriers are established that permit natural reflected daylight 
· into the shelter area. Both water supply and toilet facilities are within 
the shelter limits. Fireplaces provide emergency heating sources, and 
their massive construction provides excellent radiation barriers. 
2-7 Cost Comparison 
Tables 2-3 and 2-4 summarize some protective measures that 
can he incorporated into a residence and the resulting cost increases. 
Many protective features, such as landscaping discussed previously, 
eannot be included in general cost analysis since they would only apply 
to a specific residence. 
The major measures suggested to reduce vulnerability, and having 
the greatest bearing on the cost increase, involve structural modification, 
utilization of fire retardant framing lumber , and incorporation of shelter 
space within the residence. The tabulated total cost increases include 
these three items as applied to an entire one-story 26' by 52' residence . 
with and without a basement. The cost increase per square foot applies 
to 1350 square feet (basement area is excluded) but could serve as an 
approximate guide to other residences in the same size range. 
The percentage of total project cost is omitted since this could 
be misleading. In general, the costs as listed will represent a 5 to 20 
percent increase in the budget. This should be qualified by noting that 
it is not necessary to incorporate all of the features listed. One or more 
measures may be omitted, depending on the type of protection desired. 
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If emphasis is placed only on the structural strength of the house, the 
increase in cost per square foot ranges from about 30 cents to $1. 40. 
Total cost increase could be reduced by increasing the structural resis-
tance of only a portion of the residence. 
The strength factor is the ratio of the calculated level of failure 
of a strengthened residence compared with the calculated level of failure 
of a residence using minimum materials and connections currently ac-
ceptable. The outermost circle of Figure 2-18 represents the area of 
destruction of unstrengthened houses from a nuclear detonation. As the 
strength factors of the houses are increased, the areas of destruction 
will become progressively smaller. The percentage of decrease in area 
of destruction is noted on the circle of corresponding strength increase. 
As an example, 24% of the area within which a house would have been 
destroyed before strengthening could be considered safe if the calculated 
level of failure is increased 25% by corrective structural measure. 
strenoth foetor I 1.25 2 
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figure 2-18 comparison of strength factor w1th area of destruct ion 
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As the wall sections are increased in strength, the most econom-
ical floor and roof sections of corresponding strength are listed ·in the 
next columns. 
The use of fire-retardant framing lumber represents a major 
initial cost. Since the strength of the house is directly related to the 
board feet of framing material used, the increased cost of fire-retardant 
wood increases rapidly with strength. 
The shelter area cost is based on enclosing an eight-foot by 
ten-foot area. Above grade, a mass thickness of 200 pounds, using 
poured concrete, is assumed for the walls and the overhead barrier. 
The basement shelter is assumed to utilize two existing foundation walls. 
A mass thickness of 150 pounds is assumed on the remaining walls and 
125 pounds for the overhead. Shelter types will vary, and these shelters 
were selected to illustrate average total protection costs. 
The following material prices were used and should be adjusted 
for those areas of the country where there is wide variance: 
Framing Lumber 
Size: 
Cost per Thousand Board Feet: 
Stress Grade: 
Non-stress rated 1500f 
2x4 
2 X 6 
2 X 8 
2 X 10 
2 X 12 
Plywood CD Grade 
3/4" $0. 20/ sq. ft. 
5/8" .17 
1/2" . 15 
3/8" .12 
$145 $155 
$145 $155 
$145 $155 
$150 $160 
$170 $180 
Pressure treated fire-retardant wood - Add $90 per thousand board feet 
Concrete: Formed walls - $60/cu. yd. 
Formed slabs - $50/ cu. yd. 
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BALANCED STRUCTURAL PARTS COST INCREASE (DOLLARS) 
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1.0 2 x 4 studs spaced 24" 2 x 8 joists 2 x 8 joists 
on center with spaced 16" on spaced 24" on 
3/8" CD plywood center with 1/2" center with 3/8" 
sheathing CD plywood CD plywood 
subfloor sheathing M I N I M U M R E Q U I REMENTS 
2.0 2 X 4 @ 16 It It 96 0 0 125 5 50 300 510 1400 550 1851 1.37 1336 .99 
3/8 CD Glued 
2.5 2 X 6 @ 24 It 2 X 8 •@ 16 126 0 102 125 5 50 340 530 It It 2023 1.49 1488 1.10 
3/8 CD Glued 1/2 CD 
2.6 2 X 4 @ 12 It It 130 0 102 125 5 50 350 540 It It 2037 1. 51 1502 1 .15 
3/8 CD Glued 
4 . 0 2 X 6 @ 16 2 X 8@ 16 2 X 8 @ 16 205 34 115 125 10 50 340 530 It It 2120 1.57 1619 1.20 
3/8 CD Glued 1/2 CD Glued 1/2 CD Glued 
4.8 2 X 6 @ 24 It It 244 34 115 125 10 50 370 560 It It 2189 1.62 1688 1.25 
3/4 CD Glued 
10 50 390 610 " 
It 2286 1.69 1870 1.38 5.2 2 X 6 @ 16 2 X 10 @ 16 2 X 10 @ 16 246 89 190 125 
5/8 CD Glued 1/2 CD 1/2 CD 
5.4 2 X 6 @ 12 2 X 8 @ 12 2 X 8 @ 12 255 104 205 125 10 75 450 680 It It 2395 1. 77 2004 1.49 
3/8 CD Glued· 1/2 CD Glued 1/2 CD Glued 
6.4 2 X 6 @ 12 It It 332 104 205 125 15 75 470 700 It It 2497 1.84 2106 1.56 
5/8 CD Glued 
6.6 2 X 6 @ 16 It It 375 104 205 125 15 75 440 680 " It 2510 1.86 2129 1.65 
3/8 CD Both Sides Glued 
-
9.0 2 X 6 @ 12 2 X 10 @ 12 2 X 10 @ 12 480 191 278 125 20 75 550 810 It It 2803 2.08 2529 1.87 
3/8 CD int. Glued 1/2 CD Glued 1/2 CD Glued 5/8 CD ext. 
10.0 2 X 6 @ 12 2 X 12 @ 12 2 X 12 @ 12 724 352 433 125 20 75 630 940 It It 3282 2.43 3219 2.38 
3/4 CD Both Sides Glued 1/2 CD Glued 1/2 CD Glued 
Table 2-3 Cost Comparisons of 26' x 52' Residence with Flat Roof (Center Bearing) 
BALANCED STRUCTURAL PARTS COST INCREASE (DOLLARS) 
~ 
"' ;:1
~ 
= 
.... 
"' ~ :2 .<:: 0 't:l = ;:1 .... 
"' "' 
.... 
Slab House Basement House 
.... Roof and Ceiling bD....t ~bD <II 0 bllJ.< ~!: "' >= 't:l =: 't:l ~ ~
= 0 Construction 
"' 
O<ll O....t 
"' 
"' e .... ~~ +-' E 
Total 1$/sq.ft. ~ .... 3/8" CD Plywood Roof ~ 0 .... '-+-' .<::+-' J.<.-. ~<ll't:I,.C ~ <ll't:l ~ .-< >'t:l .-< ~ Total $/sq. ft. "'0 Wall Floor ~ 0 <IIJ.< 0.-< ~ J.<+-' 0<11 f.<+-'O<Il ~ 0 <II ~ "' .... <II ~ ~<II J::O E<ll ..... ~ o .... ..... ~ 0 <II ,<:,.OJ. .<:: J::<ll Cllf« Construction Construction Sheathing Used Throughout 
"' 
r.. lllP. <Ill ,....z f<.l'i:ii:Cil r..~il:lll Cll<Cl Cll · ... lll 
1.0 2 X 4 @ 24 2 X 8 @ 16 Roof: 2 X 6 @ 16 M I N I M U M R E Q U I RE MENTS 
3/8 CD 1/2" CD Ceiling : 2 X 6 @ 16 
1.3 2 X 4 @ 24 " "w" Truss @ 16" 65 0 0 125 5 50 325 515 1400 550 1845 1.37 1310 . 97 
3/8 CD Glued " 2 x 4 Chords , 2 x 4 web 
1.4 2 X 4 @ 16 " "w" Truss @ 24" 76 0 0 125 5 50 370 560 " " 1901 1.41 1366 1.01 
3/8 CD 2 x 6 Chord 2 x 4 web 
2 . 0 2 X 4 @ 16 " "w" Truss @ 16" 95 0 135 125 5 50 390 575 " " 2075 1.54 1535 1.14 
3/8 CD Glued 2 x 6 Chords 2 x 4 web 
2.6 2 X 4 @ 12 " Modified Howe @ 16" 130 0 156 125 5 50 405 595 " " 2146 1.59 1611 1.20 
3/8 CD Glued 2 x 6 Chords 2 x 4 web 
4.0 2 X 6 @ 16 2 X 8 @ 16 Roof: Conventional Rafters 205 34 277 125 10 65 570 740 " " 2527 1.87 2006 1.49 
3/8 CD Glued 1/2 CD Glued Ceiling : 2 X 8 @ 16 
1/2" CD Glued 
4.8 2 X 6 @ 24 " " 244 34 277 125 10 65 575 765 " " 2571 1.90 2070 1.53 
3/4 CD Glued 
5.2 2 X 6 @ 16 2 X 10 @ 16 Roof: Conventional Rafters 247 89 323 125 10 65 595 810 " " 2640 1.95 2219 1.57 
5/8 CD Glued 1/2 CD Ceiling: 2 X 10 @ 16 
1/2 CD 
5.4 2 X 6 @ 12 2 X 8 @ 12 Roof: Conventional Rafters 255 104 326 125 10 65 650 840 " " 2706 2.05 2275 1.69 
3/8 CD Glued 1/2 CD Glued Ceiling : 2 X 10 @ 16 
1/2 CD Glued 
6 .4 2 X 6 @ 12 " " 332 104 326 125 15 65 665 855 " .. 2803 2 . 08 2372 1. 75 
5/8 CD Glued 
6.6 2 X 6 @ 16 " .. 375 104 326 125 15 65 640 825 " " 2821 2.10 2385 1.77 
3/8 CD Both 
-
Sides Glued 
9.0 2 X 6 @ 12 2 X 10 @ 12 Roof : Conventional Rafter 479 191 544 125 20 65 780 1040 " " 3288 2 . 44 3014 2.24 
3/8 CD int. 1/2 CD Glued Ceiling: 2 X 10 @ 16 
5/8 CD ext. 1/2 CD Both Sides Glued 
Glued 
10.0 2 X 6 @ 12 2 X 12 @ 12 " 724 352 544 125 20 65 820 1250 1400 550 3573 2.65 3630 2.69 
3/4 CD Glued 1/2 CD Glued 
Both Sides 
Table 2-4 Cost Comparisons of 26' x 52' Residence with 4/12 Sloped Roof 
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